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Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role in America’s COVID-
Testing Debacle 
Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton 
abstract.  In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) published a series of 2020 guidance documents on how to seek Emergency Use Authoriza-
tions (EUAs) for new SARS-CoV-2 tests. These guidance documents suggest EUAs are needed 
for laboratory-developed tests (LDTs), a type of test created and used in-house by high-complex-
ity clinical laboratories that already are regulated by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amend-
ments of 1988 (CLIA). These CLIA-regulated laboratories traditionally have provided a rapid re-
sponse to emerging epidemics. Many laboratories viewed the FDA’s 2020 guidance documents as 
having a practical binding effect even though the FDA lacked clear statutory authority to require 
EUAs for LDTs developed at CLIA-compliant high-complexity laboratories. The FDA’s guidance 
documents led to decreased availability of testing, particularly in the early stages of the pandemic, 
which contributed to the catastrophic course of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.  
This Essay concludes that the FDA lacks authority to require EUAs for COVID-related LDTs and 
that the FDA’s intervention, in key respects, just replicates protections CLIA already provides. The 
Essay then discusses recently proposed legislation, known as the VALID Act of 2020, which would 
expand the FDA’s authority to regulate LDTs. While spurred by longstanding concerns about tests 
used in genomics and precision medicine, the VALID Act’s reach is much broader and would have 
harmful consequences for more traditional tests, including tests for emerging communicable dis-
eases. Before Congress acts on specific legislative proposals, a much broader, more inclusive, nu-
anced, and evidence-informed dialogue about diagnostic-testing policy is needed.  
introduction 
This Essay examines actions by the FDA that reportedly contributed to the 
delayed rollout of tests for COVID-19 in the United States in early 2020. These 
delays potentially foreclosed opportunities to arrest widespread community 
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transmission of the disease.1 When a contaminated reagent slowed deployment 
of a COVID-19 test from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
other entities such as diagnostic test manufacturers and research, clinical, and 
public health laboratories were poised to fill the void. Actions by the FDA alleg-
edly delayed or even halted some of their efforts.2 This Essay finds that while 
some of the FDA’s actions had strong statutory support, for others the agency’s 
legal authority was less clear. The FDA’s interference in areas Congress had not 
authorized the agency to regulate was an overreach, possibly the deadliest regu-
latory overreach in U.S. history. 
The COVID-19 testing debacle reveals the perils of fighting a prior war in-
stead of the war one is in. This Essay traces how policies the FDA applied to 
COVID-19 testing flowed, in large part, from ongoing efforts to modernize the 
FDA’s regulatory scheme to address genetic and genomic testing and precision 
medicine. Those policies inadvertently may have hamstrung regulation of more 
traditional diagnostic tests, including tests for emerging communicable diseases. 
While nothing will buy back time already lost, the COVID-19 outbreak casts 
a useful light on flaws in recent laboratory-testing policy. These flaws need cor-
rection, both to improve oversight during the current crisis and to avert future 
problems. COVID-19 is not the last pandemic. Hundreds of different corona-
viruses circulate in pigs, cats, camels, and bats.3 Over the past two decades, a 
handful of those viruses jumped to humans.4 More will do so on a crowded 
planet where human and animal habitats increasingly overlap.5 Coronaviruses 
are just one subset of viruses, and viruses are just one type of pathogen. Future 
 
1. See, e.g., Editorial, The Epic Failure of Coronavirus Testing in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/opinion/coronavirus-testing.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WD22-JCB6]; see also James Glanz & Campbell Robertson, Lockdown Delays Cost at 
Least 36,000 Lives, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020 
/05/20/us/coronavirus-distancing-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/4NUB-H4QB] (discuss-
ing how small delays significantly increased COVID-19 death tolls in the United States); Sen 
Pei, Sasikiran Kandula & Jeffrey Shaman, Differential Effects of Intervention Timing on COVID-
19 Spread in the United States, MEDRXIV (May 29, 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content 
/10.1101/2020.05.15.20103655v2.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4XN-ESXX] (same). 
2. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
3. Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Coronaviruses, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (May 19, 
2020), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/coronaviruses [https://perma.cc 
/7B6D-LATB]. 
4. Id. 
5. Ferris Jabr, How Humanity Unleashed a Flood of New Diseases, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 17, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/magazine/animal-disease-covid.html [https:// 
perma.cc/U2BY-BAWJ]. 
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pandemics may be worse—possibly much worse—than this one.6 Lessons from 
the current pandemic might still help us in the next one. This Essay offers rec-
ommendations for Congress on reform of diagnostic-testing policy.  
i .  the fda’s asserted authority to regulate clinical 
laboratory services during emergencies 
On January 31, 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) declared a public health emergency related to COVID-19,7 the disease 
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This declaration triggered8 the FDA’s author-
ities under sections 564, 564A, and 564B of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.9 
Section 564, enacted after the September 11 attacks, allows the FDA to grant 
EUAs for medical products that the FDA has not yet cleared or approved as safe 
and effective.10 
Section 564 allows the FDA to grant EUAs only for medical products, which 
the statute defines as “drug[s], device[s], or biological product[s].”11 It grants 
no new powers for the FDA to regulate clinical laboratory services. The essential 
distinction is that products are inanimate things such as test instruments, ma-
chines, chemical reagents, and testing software, whereas services are provided 
by humans exercising expert professional judgment (for example, diagnosing 
whether a patient does or does not have a specific disease or medical condi-
tion).12 Laboratory testing relies on a mix of products and skilled human ser-
vices, with the roles of humans and machines closely integrated and, at times, 
 
6. See, e.g., Antoine Flahault & Patrick Zylberman, Influenza Pandemics: Past, Present, and Future 
Challenges, 32 PUB. HEALTH REVS. 319, 319-22 (2010) (discussing the severity of pandemic 
threats from influenza). 
7. Alex M. Azar II, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe 
/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx [https://perma.cc/246V-H5LU]. The declaration was renewed on 
April 21, 2020, effective April 26, 2020. Alex M. Azar II, Renewal of Determination that a Public 
Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www 
.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/covid19-21apr2020.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/QE9E-6K7F]. 
8. Determination of Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7316 (Feb. 7, 2020). 
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360bbb-3, -3a, -3b (2018). 
10. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1603(a), 
117 Stat. 1392, 1684 (2003) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2018)) (adding 
section 564 to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
11. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1) (2018). 
12. See Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Optimizing FDA’s Regulatory Oversight of Next-Gen-
eration Sequencing Diagnostic Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 19 (Feb. 20, 2015), http:// 
wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170113000324/http://www.fda.gov/downloads 
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hard to distinguish.13 The FDA is charged with regulating the “test itself” but 
not the “learned expert[s]” who use the test to provide laboratory services and, 
historically, has displayed careful respect for the distinction.14 
Clinical laboratory services are separately regulated under the CLIA statute15 
and its implementing regulations,16 administered by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) rather than by the FDA. The CLIA regulations 
focus on the quality of laboratory services—for example, whether personnel are 
suitably qualified, follow appropriate policies and procedures, maintain proper 
records, and work under adequate supervision and controls.17 Laboratories sub-
ject to CLIA must obtain one of five types of CLIA certificates from CMS, de-
pending on the complexity of the testing the laboratory plans to perform.18 
The FDA fulfills one crucial duty related to CLIA: the FDA categorizes the 
diagnostic products it regulates in terms of whether they are suitable for use only 
by CLIA-certified high-complexity laboratories, as opposed to laboratories cer-
tified for less-complex testing under CLIA.19 Section 564 similarly allows the 
 
/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM439974.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EF8Y-Z7QG] (statement of Dr. David Litwack) (noting, in the context of 
testing for genetic variants, that “when we get to a learned expert looking at variants, list of 
variants, and interpreting, you know, that is probably going to lie outside the test itself”). 
13. See Barbara J. Evans, Gail Javitt, Ralph Hall, Megan Robertson, Pilar Ossorio, Susan M. Wolf, 
Thomas Morgan & Ellen Wright Clayton, How Can Law and Policy Advance Genomic Analysis 
and Interpretation for Clinical Care?, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 44, 47 (2020) (discussing the in-
terpretation of genetic test results). 
14. See Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, supra note 12, at 19. 
15. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2018)). 
16. 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1-.1850 (2020). 
17. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1357,.1405-.1407, .1443-.1461 (2020) (setting out the required qual-
ifications and responsibilities for laboratory directors, supervisory personnel, and other em-
ployees at laboratories performing tests of various complexities); id. at §§ 493.1105, .1251, 
.1283 (2020) (providing detailed requirements for maintaining and retaining records and 
making records available to state inspectors and accreditation bodies authorized to conduct 
periodic surveys under CLIA). 
18. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2020) (defining five types of CLIA certificates that allow laboratories 
to conduct tests of differing levels of complexity); see also id. § 493.17 (2020) (describing cri-
teria regulators consider when determining a test’s level of complexity). Generally speaking, 
low-complexity tests are those that require minimal scientific and technical knowledge to per-
form and for which testing materials are stable, reliable, or prepackaged and require little spe-
cial handling. Id. In contrast, high-complexity tests (of which genomic tests are an example) 
require special knowledge, skills, training, and special handling to perform accurately. Id. 
19. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR CLIA CATEGORIZATION: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Oct. 2017), https:// 
www.fda.gov/media/71065/download [https://perma.cc/B4K5-MWZT]. 
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FDA, when granting EUAs for diagnostic products, to specify the types of labor-
atories authorized to use them.20 The FDA does not, however, regulate the la-
boratories or establish standards for the clinical-testing services they provide; 
those tasks fall to CMS under CLIA. 
In responding to the COVID-19 emergency, the FDA asserted that its emer-
gency powers under section 564 encompass the power to regulate clinical labor-
atory services. This Essay questions whether that is a defensible interpretation. 
Congress has never clearly authorized the FDA to regulate clinical laboratory ser-
vices,21 nor did the Obama Administration’s FDA claim it could require EUAs 
for such services in a January 2017 guidance document interpreting its powers 
under section 564.22 The notion that the FDA can require EUAs for clinical la-
boratory services emerged in a series of guidance documents dated February 
 
20. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(m) (2018); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AU-
THORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 
AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 28 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION], 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/emergency 
-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities [https://perma.cc/Q6JK-
8E3T] (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(m) as allowing the FDA, when issuing an EUA for 
a diagnostic device, “to indicate whether the test can be performed at a point-of-care setting 
or only in a laboratory able to handle more complex tests”). 
21. See, e.g., Paul D. Clement & Lawrence H. Tribe, Laboratory Testing Services, as the Practice of 
Medicine, Cannot Be Regulated as Medical Devices, AM. CLINICAL LAB. ASS’N (Jan. 7, 2015), 
https://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/44QL-N6FJ] (arguing that Congress has distinguished laboratory 
testing services from medical devices); Jonathan R. Genzen, Jeffrey S. Mohlman, Jerry L. 
Lynch, Michael W. Squires & Ronald W. Weiss, Laboratory-Developed Tests: A Legislative and 
Regulatory Review, 63 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1575, 1582 (Oct. 2017) (tracing the debate about 
whether laboratory-developed tests (LDTs) are devices and concluding that “[i]t is unlikely 
that interpretation of current statutes and regulations can fully resolve these issues”). 
22. See EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION, supra note 20 (describing the agency’s interpretation of 
the authorities conferred by sections 564, 564A, and 564B of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act). 
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29,23 March 16,24 May 4,25 and May 11, 2020.26 These represented evolving ver-
sions of the FDA’s policy on EUAs for COVID-19 diagnostic tests, and this Essay 
focuses on the May 11 guidance, the latest version available at the time of writing. 
The 2020 dates on these documents mark them as policies of the Trump Admin-
istration, which bears responsibility for any delays in COVID-19 testing these 
policies caused—despite its attempts to pin blame on the Obama Administra-
tion.27  
As if in tacit admission that the FDA might lack authority to do some of the 
things it was doing in response to COVID-19, Congress introduced new legisla-
tion on March 5, 2020. That legislation, known as the Verifying Accurate Lead-
ing-edge IVCT [in vitro clinical test] Development (VALID) Act of 2020, would 
empower the FDA to regulate LDTs, which traditionally have been treated as 
part of CLIA-regulated clinical laboratory services rather than as FDA-regulated 
medical devices.28 Earlier versions of the proposed VALID Act had been circulat-
ing in Washington for several years after an abortive FDA attempt to regulate 
LDTs through an October 2014 draft guidance document.29 In 2016, the agency 
 
23. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DIAGNOSTICS TESTING IN LABORATORIES CERTIFIED 
TO PERFORM HIGH COMPLEXITY TESTING UNDER CLIA PRIOR TO EMERGENCY USE AUTHORI-
ZATION FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY POLICY 
FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (Feb. 29, 
2020) [hereinafter POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (Feb. 29, 2020)] https://www 
.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2020-D-0987-0007& 
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/26NA-6B3V]. 
24. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS DURING THE PUB-
LIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter POLICY FOR CORO-
NAVIRUS DISEASE (Mar. 16, 2020)]. 
25. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS DURING THE PUB-
LIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (REVISED) (May 4, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter POLICY 
FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 4, 2020)]. 
26. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS DURING THE PUB-
LIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (REVISED) (May 11, 2020), [hereinafter POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS 
DISEASE (May 11, 2020)], https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance 
-documents/policy-coronavirus-disease-2019-tests-during-public-health-emergency 
-revised [https://perma.cc/QF6U-NE6T]. 
27. See Jessica McDonald, Trump’s Misplaced Blame on Obama for Coronavirus Tests, 
FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/trumps-misplaced 
-blame-on-obama-for-coronavirus-tests [https://perma.cc/X4DG-HZKT]. 
28. H.R. 6102, 116th Cong. (2020) (companion to S. 3404, 116th Cong. (2020)). 
29. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES; FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LA-
BORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LTDS) (Oct. 3, 2014) https://www.fda.gov/regulatory 
-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/framework-regulatory-oversight-laboratory-
developed-tests-ldts [https://perma.cc/P5YV-RNXU]. 
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abandoned that draft LDT guidance amid questions about the agency’s jurisdic-
tion to regulate laboratory services.30 Efforts shifted to drafting new legislation 
to clarify the agency’s authority. As the COVID-19 crisis unfolded, proponents 
of the VALID Act tweaked it to highlight its relevance to current events and in-
troduced identical bills in the Senate and House.31 
Congress has not, as of yet, enacted the proposed VALID Act. This Essay 
argues that the delay is fortunate, because the COVID-19 testing debacle displays 
weaknesses in the VALID Act’s approach. The VALID Act would make perma-
nent certain policies that the FDA embraced in its 2020 guidance documents on 
EUAs for COVID-19 testing.32 This Essay explores why these policies are prob-
lematic when applied to LDTs for emerging infectious diseases. The VALID Act 
would grant the FDA a broad mandate to regulate all categories of LDTs across 
the board, without nuancing this mandate for specific types of LDTs or confirm-
ing that FDA oversight adds value for all of them. The VALID Act’s approach, 
whatever its merits may be for LDTs used in genomic testing and precision med-
icine, caused deadly delays when applied to LDTs for SARS-CoV-2 testing. Even 
if the VALID Act’s approach may be suitable for some categories of LDTs, the 
proposed legislation needs careful tailoring before being applied to all LDTs. 
Several years ago, Paul Clement and Lawrence Tribe observed that “[m]any 
clinical laboratories track world trends regarding infectious diseases and have 
demonstrated immediate or near-immediate responses to infectious diseases 
ranging from SARS to H1N1 and Avian Influenza.”33 American laboratories sim-
ilarly rose to the occasion during the COVID-19 epidemic. Late in January, a re-
search laboratory in Seattle geared up to conduct COVID-19 testing on nasal 
swabs already collected as part of an ongoing flu study.34 But on February 16, 
they were ordered to stop for want of an FDA approval to conduct COVID-19 
 
30. See Thomas M. Burton, FDA Backs off Plans to Issue Rules Governing Lab-Developed Tests, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2016, 8:41 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-backs-off-plans-to 
-issue-rules-governing-lab-developed-tests-1479529259 [https://perma.cc/C9GN-NA43]; 
see also Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/102367/download [https://perma.cc/K8GQ-7VL7] (ex-
plaining that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had abandoned its draft LDT 
guidance because public comments revealed more complexity and stakeholder resistance than 
the FDA initially anticipated). 
31. See H.R. 6102; S. 3404. 
32. See POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (Feb. 29, 2020), supra note 23; POLICY FOR CORONA-
VIRUS DISEASE (Mar. 16, 2020), supra note 24; POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 4, 
2020), supra note 25; POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 11, 2020), supra note 26. 
33. Clement & Tribe, supra note 21, at 18. 
34. Sheri Fink & Mark Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set Back the U.S. 
Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us 
/coronavirus-testing-delays.html [https://perma.cc/XWZ2-MLAE]. 
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testing.35 Another laboratory director reports that “February was a frustrating 
month for my laboratory. We wanted to make tests to detect the virus that causes 
COVID-19. . . . The Food and Drug Administration told us to stop.”36 In May 
2020, the FDA instructed a COVID-testing partnership including a state public 
health authority, academic laboratories, and the Gates Foundation to “[p]lease 
discontinue patient testing and return of diagnostic results to patients until 
proper authorization is obtained.”37 
Laboratory-testing services long have been the front line of the nation’s rapid 
response to emerging infectious diseases. Clement and Tribe issued a warning 
that in 2015 seemed overwrought but, in light of recent events, now seems pro-
phetic: “In these fast-moving life-or-death situations, awaiting . . . the comple-
tion of FDA’s clearance procedures could entail potentially catastrophic delays, 
with disastrous consequences for patient care.”38 A flood of dispiriting headlines 
early in 2020 confirms that their concern was not undue: “How the Coronavirus 
Became an American Catastrophe”;39 “‘Massive Blindspot’: Missing Data in 
COVID Pandemic Leaves US Vulnerable”;40 “A Mayor Accepts a Nightmare: 
The COVID Tests Won’t Come”;41 “‘We’re in Big Trouble’: Microsoft Co-
 
35. Id. 
36. Brian H. Shirts, We’ll See More Shortages of Diagnostic Tests if the FDA Has Its Way, STAT (Apr. 
15, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/15/diagnostic-tests-shortages-fda-decision 
[https://perma.cc/9S68-3G26]. 
37. Mike Baker, F.D.A. Halts Coronavirus Testing Program Backed by Bill Gates, N.Y. TIMES (May 
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/coronavirus-testing-seattle-bill-gates 
.html [https://perma.cc/YW3E-92XS] (quoting a memorandum from the FDA). 
38. Clement & Tribe, supra note 21, at 18. 
39. Alexis C. Madrigal & Robinson Meyer, How the Coronavirus Became an American Catastrophe, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-many 
-americans-are-sick-lost-february/608521 [https://perma.cc/2VXQ-EES8]. 
40. Ella Torres, ‘Massive Blindspot’: Missing Data in COVID Pandemic Leaves US Vulnerable, ABC 
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2020, 2:16 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/massive-blindspot-missing 
-data-covid-pandemic-leaves-us/story?id=70094182 [https://perma.cc/63BD-4S3M]. 
41. Erin Banco, A Mayor Accepts a Nightmare: The COVID Tests Won’t Come, DAILY BEAST (May 4, 
2020, 4:41 AM ET), https://www.thedailybeast.com/a-mayor-accepts-a-nightmare-the 
-covid-tests-wont-come [https://perma.cc/WG97-NVS3]. 
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Founder Bill Gates Slams the ‘Mismanagement’ of the Coronavirus Testing Sys-
tem and Warns We Can’t ‘Wave a Wand’ to Get the Economy Back to Normal”;42 
and “It’s Too Late to Avoid Disaster, but There Are Still Things We Can Do.”43 
One thing Americans can do is to ask whether the FDA’s 2020 EUA policies 
reflected a lawful exercise of the agency’s authority to regulate LDTs. If the 
agency overreached its current legal authority, the question is whether the FDA’s 
authority should be expanded, as the VALID Act would do, to encompass the 
powers that the FDA asserted (but did not have) in its 2020 EUA policies. To the 
extent those policies delayed the nation’s response to the recent pandemic, the 
proposed legislation is fundamentally flawed and needs major modification—to 
avert future harm—before Congress should consider it.  
i i .  did the fda overreach in regulating covid-19 tests? 
Congress grants the FDA authority to regulate medical devices, which Con-
gress defines in a way that includes instruments, apparatuses, machines, rea-
gents, and related articles or components that are intended for use in the diag-
nosis, prevention, cure, mitigation, or treatment of disease.44 This definition 
encompasses in vitro diagnostic (IVD) products, which are test kits manufac-
tured by third parties and sold to clinical laboratories for use in collecting, pre-
paring, and examining specimens from the human body to diagnose disease or 
determine a person’s state of health.45 There is no question that the FDA can 
regulate test kits, and the agency is squarely within its authority to require EUAs 
for COVID-related test kits, sample collection kits, and other IVD products that 
the agency has not yet cleared or approved.46 As of July 21, 2020, the agency had 
granted EUAs for 150 IVD products.47 
 
42. Francis Mulraney, ‘We’re in Big Trouble’: Microsoft Co-founder Bill Gates Slams the ‘Mismanage-
ment’ of the Coronavirus Testing System and Warns We Can’t ‘Wave a Wand’ to Get the Economy 
Back to Normal, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 9, 2020, 6:34 PM EDT), https://www.dailymail.co.uk 
/news/article-8206405/Were-big-trouble-Microsoft-founder-Bill-Gates-warns-coronavirus 
-testing-improve.html [https://perma.cc/Q9DK-BNDZ]. 
43. Michael T. Osterholm & Mark Olshaker, Opinion, It’s Too Late to Avoid Disaster, but There Are 
Still Things We Can Do, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03 
/27/opinion/coronavirus-trump-testing-shortages.html [https://perma.cc/AUN5-RRTH]. 
44. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018). 
45. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a) (2020). 
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2018). 
47. Emergency Use Authorization: Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) Information, and List of All 
Current EUAs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and 
-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization 
#covidinvitrodev [https://perma.cc/43DN-AASV].  
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Instead of purchasing ready-made test kits, some laboratories have the nec-
essary expertise to create their own LDTs in-house. The FDA defines an LDT as 
an IVD that is “intended for clinical use and designed, manufactured, and used 
within a single laboratory.”48 Here, a single laboratory means a facility with a single 
certificate to operate under the CLIA regulations, and the FDA and CMS both 
maintain that LDTs should only be developed and used at laboratories qualified 
to perform high-complexity testing under CLIA.49 
If a CLIA-certified high-complexity laboratory creates a test exclusively for 
use at its own facility, the test is an LDT. An LDT supports the delivery of a 
laboratory’s CLIA-regulated professional services and traditionally has been 
treated as part of those services rather than as a medical device in its own right.50 
This concept is similar to tort doctrines that protect physicians and hospitals 
from strict product liability in situations where the healthcare provider charges 
for a medical device as part of a larger transaction to provide surgical services to 
implant the device. Technically, the healthcare provider is a device seller and 
seemingly could face strict product liability if the device proves defective, but 
courts tend to shield providers on the theory that providing the surgical ser-
vices—rather than selling the device—was the main point of the transaction.51 
If the same laboratory creates the same test and shares it for use by other 
laboratories, the test is no longer an LDT. A critical distinction between LDTs 
and FDA-regulated IVDs is that the former are used by those who designed them 
whereas IVDs are designed for use by third parties and hence at a minimum re-
quire greater attention to operability. By sharing the test, the laboratory crosses 
a jurisdictional line and becomes an FDA-regulated IVD product manufacturer. 
On February 4, the FDA granted its first COVID-related EUA for a diagnostic 
 
48. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES; FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LA-
BORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LTDS) 5 (Oct. 3, 2014) (emphasis added), https://www 
.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/framework-regulatory 
-oversight-laboratory-developed-tests-ldts [https://perma.cc/4XWF-LVU2]. Note that the 
use “within a single laboratory” does not preclude the laboratory from testing specimens col-
lected at external clinics and hospitals and reporting results back to those facilities for use in 
patient care. It merely precludes the laboratory that created an LDT from sharing the LDT 
with other laboratories for their use, because doing so would amount to manufacturing a test 
kit for shipment to the other laboratories and would subject the first laboratory to FDA regu-
lation as a test kit manufacturer. 
49. Id. at 5 n.5; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
CLIA OVERVIEW: WHAT IS CMS’S AUTHORITY REGARDING LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS 
(LDTS) AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM FDA’S AUTHORITY? 3 (Oct. 22, 2013), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/LDT-and 
-CLIA_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/99PD-6H39]. 
50. See, e.g., Clement & Tribe, supra note 21, at 4-6. 
51. See, e.g., Royer v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 741 A.2d 74 (N.H. 1999). 
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test kit developed by a CDC laboratory.52 The test was not an LDT because the 
CDC intended to ship the test kits for use by other laboratories. In effect, the 
CDC laboratory was manufacturing an IVD product and the FDA properly re-
quired it to seek an EUA. 
The FDA’s 2020 EUA guidance documents53 entered shaky statutory ground, 
however, by suggesting that the FDA can require EUAs for LDTs that CLIA-
certified, high-complexity laboratories develop for their own use. Technically, 
LDTs do seem to fit the definition of an FDA-regulable medical device; they con-
sist of instruments, apparatuses, machines, reagents, and related articles that are 
“intended for use in the diagnosis[,] . . . cure, mitigation, treatment, or preven-
tion of disease.”54 However, LDTs serve as a technical aid that extends the per-
ceptual and cognitive capabilities of licensed laboratory professionals who actu-
ally render the diagnosis and bear responsibility if it is wrong. If a doctor crafts 
a new pair of reading glasses to use when writing prescriptions, the glasses are 
not an FDA-regulable medical device even though the doctor intends them for 
use in treatment of disease.55 They are an aid to the doctor’s professional services, 
and if they are inadequate in ways that place patients at risk, that is a matter for 
oversight by the physician’s licensing authority and through exposure to tort li-
ability. More generally, if every instrument, apparatus, machine, reagent, or re-
lated article that healthcare professionals use while diagnosing and treating pa-
tients was deemed to be a medical device, virtually everything in clinics and 
laboratories would be subject to FDA regulation. 
LDTs, as part of clinical laboratory services, traditionally have been subject 
to the CLIA regulatory framework.56 CLIA-certified laboratories receive federal 
oversight, including oversight of their LDTs, under the CLIA regulations.57 The 
CLIA program requires CLIA-compliant laboratories to hire scientifically quali-
fied personnel and to follow rigorous testing and record-keeping procedures.58 
CLIA also oversees the analytical validity of tests—that is, how well a test 
 
52. Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Robert R. Redfield, 
Dir., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention 1 (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media 
/134919/download [https://perma.cc/6K6E-KTWG]. 
53. See supra notes 23-26. 
54. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018). 
55. Id. 
56. See generally Clement & Tribe, supra note 21 (tracing this history). 
57. 42 C.F.R. § 493 (2020). 
58. See, e.g., id. §§ 493.1357, .1405-.1407, .1443-.1461 (setting out required qualifications and re-
sponsibilities for laboratory directors, supervisory personnel, and other employees at labora-
tories performing tests of various complexities); id. §§ 493.1105, .1251., .1283 (providing de-
tailed requirements for maintaining and retaining records and making records available to 
state inspectors and accreditation bodies authorized to conduct periodic surveys under CLIA). 
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measures its “analyte,” the property or characteristic the test aims to detect59—
considering factors such as the test’s accuracy, its rate of false positives and neg-
atives, and its reliability in the sense of repeatedly producing the same result on 
similar biospecimens.60 Laboratories introducing a new LDT must validate its 
accuracy before placing it in service61 and must conduct periodic proficiency tests 
to check its performance on specimens where the correct result has already been 
determined by other methods.62 CLIA calls for the results of these validation 
procedures and proficiency tests to be reviewed during periodic surveys by state 
inspectors or authorized accreditation bodies.63 Laboratories in two states (New 
York and Washington) are CLIA-exempt and receive oversight by state labora-
tory regulators whose requirements CMS has determined are equal to or more 
stringent than CLIA’s requirements.64 
The Human Genome Project in the 1990s sparked a critique of the CLIA 
program, centered on whether CLIA provides an adequate regulatory framework 
for genetic and genomic LDTs.65 A major concern is that CLIA addresses only 
 
59. See id. § 493.2 (defining the term “analyte” as “a substance or constituent for which the labor-
atory conducts testing,” for purposes of the CLIA regulations). 
60. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49 (summarizing CLIA’s require-
ments); see also Enhancing the Oversight of Genetic Tests: Recommendations of the SACGT, SEC-
RETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETIC TESTING 15 n.10 (July 2000), https://osp.od.nih 
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/oversight_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QD2-8TR4] 
(defining analytical validity). 
61. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 2 (“Under the CLIA regula-
tions, when a laboratory uses a test system that has not received FDA clearance or approval, 
such as a LDT, the laboratory may not release any test results prior to establishing certain 
performance characteristics relating to analytical validity for the use of that test system in the 
laboratory’s own environment, see 42 C.F.R. 493.1253(b)(2) (establishment of performance 
specifications).”). 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(3) (2018) (describing CLIA’s proficiency testing program). 
63. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CLINICAL 
LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS (CLIA) STATE SURVEY AGENCY CONTACTS, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/CLIASA 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX8Z-TM47] (listing state bodies authorized to conduct CLIA in-
spections); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIST OF APPROVED ACCREDITATION OR-
GANIZATIONS UNDER THE CLINICAL LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS (CLIA), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/AOList 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/32HT-3P8W] (listing the accreditation bodies that the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has approved). 
64. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., LIST OF EX-
EMPT STATES UNDER THE CLINICAL LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS (CLIA), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Ex-
emptStatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G59-HW5G]. 
65. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH-DEP’T OF ENERGY WORKING GRP. ON ETHICAL, LEGAL & SOC. 
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, PROMOTING 
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analytical validity, but not clinical validity.66 Clinical validity “refers to the accu-
racy with which a test predicts the presence or absence of a clinical condition or 
predisposition” to disease.67 It depends not so much on attributes of the test it-
self as on the state of scientific knowledge more generally: is there a strong and 
well-validated association between having a particular analyte (such as the pres-
ence or absence of a particular genetic variant in a person’s genome) and having 
a specific health condition?68  
With traditional diagnostic tests, such as a test for strep infection, analytical 
validity or accurate detection of the analyte (i.e., the presence or absence of strep-
tococcus) provides useful information to guide clinical care. With genomic tests, 
merely detecting an analyte (a particular genetic variant) does not always pro-
vide clinically useful information to guide diagnostic or treatment decisions. Sci-
entists may not yet know how the variant affects human health, or people who 
have the variant may exhibit differing physical manifestations of disease—or 
none at all—for reasons not always understood. Thus, even an analytically valid 
genetic test may not offer meaningful insight into the person’s health.69 
Another concern about CLIA is that it has not always been vigorously en-
forced. A 2006 report by the United States Government Accountability Office 
documented lax enforcement of CLIA’s statutory requirements, including the 
proficiency-testing program that is central to CLIA’s oversight of analytical va-
lidity.70 There also are logistical and practical differences between CLIA and FDA 
regulation. For example, CLIA ensures review of laboratories’ validation and 
proficiency-testing data during biennial surveys that may occur months after a 
laboratory has introduced a new LDT, whereas the FDA ostensibly requires prior 
review of IVD products before they can be used71 (although, in reality, only one 
percent of FDA-regulated medical devices pass through its premarket approval 
 
SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (Neil A. Holtzman & Mi-
chael S. Watson eds., 1997), https://www.genome.gov/10001733/genetic-testing-report 
[https://perma.cc/KG4W-AV6R]; SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra 
note 60, 8-9. 
66. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 2 (“CMS’[s] CLIA program 
does not address the clinical validity of any test.”). 
67. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 60, at 15 n.11 (defining clinical va-
lidity). 
68. Simon Sanderson, Ron Zimmern, Mark Kroese, Julian Higgins, Christine Patch & Jon Emery, 
How Can the Evaluation of Genetic Tests be Enhanced? Lessons Learned from the ACCE Framework 
and Evaluating Genetic Tests in the United Kingdom, 7 GENETICS MED. 495, 495-500 (2015). 
69. Wylie Burke, Clinical Validity and Clinical Utility of Genetic Tests, 81 CURRENT PROTOCOLS IN 
HUM. GENETICS 9.15.1 (2014). 
70. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-416, CLINICAL LAB QUALITY: CMS AND 
SURVEY OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 33 (2006). 
71. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 3. 
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process that requires a data-driven review of safety and effectiveness).72 The 
FDA also has adverse-event reporting and surveillance systems aimed at detect-
ing problems after IVD products move into clinical use.73 
The FDA’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed an agency that has 
been under intense pressure for over twenty years to address perceived weak-
nesses in CLIA’s oversight of genetic and genomic LDTs. The agency appeared 
to presume that CLIA is inadequate and the FDA needs to step up. Whether this 
CLIA critique, which centers on genetic and genomic testing, has any relevance 
to COVID-19 testing is not clear. The FDA’s May 11, 2020 guidance sets out pol-
icies for two types of COVID-19 LDTs: diagnostic tests to detect presence of the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus and serological/antibody tests to detect antibodies humans 
produce when exposed to it.74 COVID-19 diagnostic tests do employ certain ge-
netic-testing techniques (e.g., polymerase chain reaction to make copies of the 
analyte), and they detect RNA of the coronavirus pathogen, but they are not 
human genetic tests of the type for which the FDA’s genetic-testing policies were 
designed. 
COVID-19 diagnostic tests are the type of traditional diagnostic tests for 
which the CLIA program was originally designed. Accurately detecting the ana-
lyte (i.e., the SARS-CoV-2 virus) provides clinically significant information that 
is useful in managing patient care and public health. Unlike genetic tests, where 
there may be significant scientific debate about the clinical significance of partic-
ular genetic variants, there is little dispute among scientists that having SARS-
CoV-2 in your body is a bad thing. With serological/antibody tests that purport 
to detect antibodies against SARS-CoV-2, there is more room to question the 
clinical validity of an analytically valid test result. Scientists still are unsure 
whether having antibodies confers future immunity, and for how long. Never-
theless, an analytically valid finding that a person has COVID-19 antibodies is 
clinically significant because it confirms an infection in the past. As long as anti-
body tests are marketed and reported in ways that refrain from making ground-
less claims (e.g., “Congratulations! You are immune!”),75 there is no reason why 
 
72. See INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 4 (2011). 
73. Id. at 129-33 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of FDA’s adverse-event reporting and 
medical device surveillance systems). 
74. See POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 11, 2020), supra note 26, at 4, 5 n.3. 
75. Whether the presence of antibodies should be used to determine, for example, who can go to 
work, as a so-called “immunity passport,” is outside the purview of either the FDA or CMS’s 
CLIA program, or the scope of this Essay. For a discussion of immunity passports, see Natalie 
Kofler & Françoise Baylis, Ten Reasons Why Immunity Passports Are a Bad Idea, 581 NATURE 379 
(2020) (listing practical and ethical objections to such uses). 
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analytically valid, CLIA-regulated antibody LDTs should not move in U.S. com-
merce, just as Congress, by enacting the CLIA statute, intended them to move. 
Even though section 564 grants no new authority for the FDA to regulate 
clinical laboratory services,76 the agency’s May 11, 2020 guidance on EUAs for 
COVID-19 LDTs cites section 564 as its source of statutory authority.77 The guid-
ance calls for LDTs to be “validated prior to use”78 and suggests validation pro-
cedures that “should be performed to ensure analytical and clinical validity.”79 At 
first blush, the FDA seems to be adding value; isn’t it better to confirm analytical 
and clinical validity, rather than analytical validity alone? On closer inspection, 
the guidance’s validation procedures scarcely venture beyond the analytical vali-
dation that CLIA already requires. For example, the FDA directs laboratories to 
assess limits of an LDT’s ability to detect the property or characteristic it purports 
to detect80 and whether the LDT gives concordant results on samples that al-
ready have been tested using other available methods.81 These FDA procedures 
“to ensure analytical and clinical validity”82 simply echo CLIA’s analytical validity 
requirements. CLIA-certified high-complexity clinical laboratories already must 
internally validate their LDTs before placing them in service, and they must 
“proficiency test” their LDTs by comparing performance on specimens already 
tested using alternative methods. The FDA’s procedures do nothing to address 
clinical validity. 
As under CLIA, the FDA performs no independent validation of its own. In-
stead, the agency relies on a laboratory’s skilled personnel to conduct their own 
validation procedures, focusing on analytical validity. The only difference lies in 
the timing of regulatory review of the data. CLIA’s surveys are biennial, whereas 
the FDA’s guidance calls on laboratories to submit data on their LDTs within 
fifteen days of commencing testing under an EUA. Perhaps that adds value, but 
one could debate whether, in the midst of a rapidly unfolding national emer-
gency, America’s small cohort of highly skilled, CLIA-certified laboratory per-
sonnel were best utilized by having them complete unfamiliar paperwork to sub-
mit data to an unfamiliar regulator that apparently lacked authority to require 
them to do so.83 
 
76. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. 
77. See POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 11, 2020), supra note 26, at 6. 
78. Id. at 8. 
79. Id.; see also id. at 17-20 (describing the procedures). 
80. Id. at 18. 
81. Id. at 18-19. 
82. Id. at 8. 
83. See Julia Ioffe, The Infuriating Story of How the Government Stalled Coronavirus Testing, GQ 
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.gq.com/story/inside-americas-coronavirus-testing-crisis 
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Does this imply that the FDA’s 2020 EUA guidances were unlawful? The an-
swer is no, but that answer rests on an obscure legal fine point. Agency guidance 
documents are nonbinding, which means they have no legal force independent 
of the statutes and regulations they interpret or implement.84 The FDA did not 
actually force laboratories to do things that the agency has no power to require; 
the agency merely recommended they do so. “Nonbinding” means that the FDA 
cannot punish a laboratory for failing to comply with an FDA guidance docu-
ment and instead would have to prove that the laboratory violated the underly-
ing statute (in this case, section 564) that the guidance purports to interpret.85 
When a guidance lacks statutory foundation, an agency would never be able to 
prove that. 
The May 11 guidance clearly states that it “do[es] not establish legally en-
forceable responsibilities” and “should be viewed only as recommendations.”86 
It merely “encourages” CLIA-certified high-complexity laboratories to submit 
EUA’s for their LDTs.87 It says “laboratories should notify FDA” after they com-
plete the validation process and “recommends” that they submit a completed 
EUA request within fifteen days.88 It warns that if this is not done, the “FDA 
intends to remove the laboratory from its website listing of laboratories that have 
notified FDA and may take additional actions as appropriate.”89 The first part of 
this threat is innocuous: the FDA will stop saying you complied with its guid-
ance if you did not comply with it. The part about “additional actions” sounds 
more threatening. Still, taking additional action “as appropriate” may amount to 
taking no action if an agency lacks legal authority to force you to do as it recom-
mends.  
A laboratory with alert legal counsel would know that guidance documents 
are nonbinding and might realize when an agency’s guidance is at odds with the 
law. That does not imply that the laboratory is free to disregard the guidance. 
 
[https://perma.cc/6856-MJXE] (outlining the highly burdensome, and at times duplicative, 
FDA paperwork requirements to which one Seattle clinical laboratory was subjected as it 
struggled to bring a COVID-19 diagnostic test onstream). 
84. See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 331, 334 n.14, 347 (2011) (“This [lack of independent legal force] means that a 
person who is alleged to have violated an agency’s regulatory law must be shown to have vio-
lated the underlying statute or legislative rule [i.e., regulation] that the agency is implement-
ing; it is not sufficient for the agency to demonstrate that the person violated [the guidance 
document].”). 
85. Id. at 347. 
86. POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (May 11, 2020), supra note 26, at 5. 
87. Id. at 7. 
88. Id. at 9 
89. Id. at 9. 
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Nonbinding guidances often induce “grudging compliance, ‘even when the 
doubts as to the lawfulness of the [guidance] are substantial.’”90 The practical 
reality is that even a flawed guidance document “still establishes the law for all 
those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of challenging the agency 
in court.”91 When that happens, a guidance is said to be “practical[ly] binding”92 
even though the agency could not actually enforce it.93 
Laboratories, staffed by busy scientists with little expertise in regulatory af-
fairs and passionate about obtaining accurate test results, are an easy mark for 
regulators seeking to use guidance documents to work around inconvenient stat-
utes. They often comply with flawed guidance documents out of the mistaken 
belief that anything a regulator says must be legally required and, in any event, 
not worth the trouble to fight. This is not the first time an HHS agency has used 
guidance to regulate laboratories in ways that Congress, when enacting federal 
statutes, never envisioned. Another recent instance was a guidance document 
that CMS posted on its CLIA web site, without notice or comment, to implement 
a policy that the CLIA statute clearly does not seem to support.94 The FDA’s 2020 
COVID-19 EUA guidance may be another example. Section 564 does not clearly 
allow the FDA to require EUAs for LDTs, but as of July 21, 2020, thirty-seven 
clinical laboratories had given practical binding effect to the guidance. They duly 
applied for and were granted EUAs for COVID diagnostic LDTs.95  
90. Sean Croston, The Petition Is Mightier than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles 
Over ‘Regulation Through Guidance’, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 387 (2011) (quoting William Funk, 
A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2001)).
91. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 397, 400 (2007) (quoting Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal 
Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 167 (2000)).
92. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992).
93. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (observing that 
guid-ance “can as a practical matter, have a binding effect. If an agency acts as if a document 
issued at headquarters is controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the same manner 
as it treats a legislative rule . . . [and] if it leads private parties . . . to believe that [the 
agency] will [apply the policy expressed in the document], then the agency’s document is for 
all practical purposes ‘binding.’”).
94. See Barbara J. Evans & Susan M. Wolf, A Faustian Bargain that Undermines Research Partici-
pants’ Privacy Rights and Return of Results, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1281 (2019) (discussing CMS’s use of 
guidance to implement policies not supported by the CLIA statute); Jason Bobe & George 
Church, PDF that Blocks Study Participants from Getting Their Own Data Needs to Go, 
STATNEWS (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/unsigned-pdf-stifles
-researchers-from-sharing-data-with-participants [https://perma.cc/DP9B-94RQ].
95. Emergency Use Authorization: Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) Information, and List of All 
Current EUAs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 10, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/emergency
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i i i .  how did this happen, and what can be learned? 
As a focus of legal scholarship, the regulation of clinical laboratory testing 
resembles baseball, with long innings of boredom broken by intermittent—very 
intermittent—moments when what is happening on the field seems important 
and exciting to spectators. The recent American COVID-19-testing debacle is 
the latest “baseball moment” when laboratory testing draws scholarly interest. It 
is the third such moment in sixty years. 
The first began in the 1960s and focused scholarly concern on problems with 
inaccurate testing. Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in mid-1965 
made the federal government a major payor for clinical laboratory testing ser-
vices.96 An array of new and increasingly complex testing technologies were 
moving into wider use at that same time, raising concern that federal dollars 
might be wasted on low-quality tests. An example was that the use of Papanico-
lau (Pap) tests for cervical cancer screening expanded from thirty percent of 
women in 1960 to fifty percent in 1970 and eighty percent in 1980,97 despite 
perceived concerns with test accuracy.98 These trends prompted calls for federal 
oversight of laboratory testing, a traditional area of state regulation,99 and Con-
gress enacted the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967.100 Jurisdictional 
limits of the 1967 statute allowed some low-quality laboratories to escape federal 
oversight, and a public scandal erupted in the 1980s when inaccurate Pap tests 




96. CMS’ Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 13, 2020, 2:44 PM) 
https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History [https://perma.cc/Z5XU 
-22RA]. 
97. Marguerite B. Vigliani, Whatever Happened to the Annual Pap Smear?, 2013 R.I. MED. J. 36, 36 
(January). 
98. Willian J. Frable, Proficiency Testing for Cytologists: Where Science, Biology, and Government Reg-
ulations Collide, 105 CANCER CYTOPATHOLOGY 119, 120 (2005). 
99. Barbara J. Evans, HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic Data: Reconciling Safety and 
Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 6 (2018) (pointing out that laboratory testing was 
traditionally regulated by the states as part of the practice of medicine). 
100. Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 263a (1982)). 
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went undiagnosed.101 Today’s CLIA statute,102 enacted in 1988, expanded federal 
oversight to address those concerns. 
Advances in genetics posed the second round of policy challenges. A govern-
mental task force formed in 1991 felt genetic tests raise unique regulatory and 
policy issues.103 Most of the commercially available genetic tests in the 1990s 
were LDTs, and the FDA came under pressure to play a larger role in regulating 
genetic LDTs.104 It was in this era, in 1992, that the FDA first claimed it had 
authority to regulate LDTs as medical devices.105 The FDA’s failed 2014 LDT 
guidance106 and the more recent VALID Act legislative proposal107 reflect ongo-
ing efforts to address these challenges. 
An important insight, however, was lost along the way. Early calls for the 
FDA to expand its oversight of genetic LDTs in the 1990s were rooted in genetic 
exceptionalism, the notion that “genetic tests should be treated differently from 
other laboratory tests for oversight purposes.”108 By 2008, however, the Secre-
tary’s Advisory Committee for Genetics, Health, and Society observed a growing 
 
101. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Initiatives to Improve Quality of Laboratory Testing 
Under the CLIA Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1 (July 2006), https://www 
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2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2018)). 
103. Enhancing the Oversight of Genetic Tests: Recommendations of the SACGT, supra note 60, at 13 
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ment of Energy (DOE) Task Force on Genetic Testing and its Joint NIH-DOE Committee to 
Evaluate the Ethical-Legal, and Social Implications Program of the Human Genome Project). 
104. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
105. See Clement & Tribe, supra note 21, at 6 n.1 (tracing FDA’s first assertion of authority to reg-
ulate LDTs to 1992). 
106. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES; FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LA-
BORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LTDS) (Oct. 3, 2014) https://www.fda.gov/regulatory 
-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/framework-regulatory-oversight-laboratory 
-developed-tests-ldts [https://perma.cc/P5YV-RNXU]. 
107. See H.R. 6102, 116th Cong. (2020) (companion to S. 3404, 116th Cong. (2020)). 
108. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, U.S. System of Oversight 
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trend to reject exceptionalist approaches.109 This trend colored the FDA’s subse-
quent policies, which favor uniform approaches for all LDTs, eschewing more 
tailored approaches that would address particular problems posed by genetic, 
genomic, and other modern molecular diagnostic tests while leaving policies for 
more traditional tests undisturbed. The FDA’s 2014 draft LDT guidance dis-
cussed how modern LDT technology has evolved and differs greatly from the 
traditional types of CLIA-regulated LDTs.110 Yet instead of developing the over-
sight needed for more complex tests, it proposed a unitary framework in which 
the FDA would regulate all LDTs. Without exploring the possible consequences, 
traditional types of CLIA-regulated LDTs, including tests for communicable dis-
eases, got swept up in the push to modernize the regulation of genetic and ge-
nomic testing. 
The third policy challenge is the current one, in which the consequences of 
that approach are only too clear. A worldwide pandemic casts doubt on the wis-
dom of one-size-fits-all policy solutions that grant the FDA broad power to reg-
ulate all LDTs, regardless of type. Such solutions reject the notion that complex-
ity and risk matter, yet the COVID-19-testing debacle displays why they do 
matter. COVID-19 raises a question: Have policies crafted to address genetic 
testing weakened the nation’s response to communicable diseases? 
The proposed VALID Act would solidify the FDA’s authority to regulate clin-
ical laboratories, granting powers that the FDA asserted without a clear statutory 
basis in its 2020 COVID-19 EUA guidance documents as well as imposing sig-
nificant new FDA regulatory burdens on research laboratories.111 Before enact-
ing that legislation, there should be a thorough review of how FDA oversight 
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tion 578R of the VALID Act, which mirrors the cumbersome and time-consuming Investiga-
tional Device Exemption requirements at Part 812 of the FDA’s existing medical device 
regulations. H.R. 6102, 116th Cong. § 587a(m) (2020). The result, under the VALID Act, is a 
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performed during the COVID-19 crisis. Did it add value beyond what CLIA reg-
ulation of CLIA-certified, high-complexity laboratories already provides? Did it 
cause delays and distract laboratory personnel from higher-priority tasks in the 
midst of an emergency? 
It also will be crucial for Congress to hold hearings to ensure all stakeholders 
in the genetic and diagnostic-testing industries are heard before acting on the 
proposed VALID Act. The independent Diagnostic Test Working Group, affili-
ated with ten of America’s largest diagnostic device manufacturers and large 
commercial clinical laboratories, provided input on the VALID Act and engaged 
lobbyists to work with the Senate, House, and the FDA.112 Its efforts began the 
month after the FDA published its October 2014 draft LDT guidance113 and pro-
duced a concept document for regulatory and legislative reforms the following 
March.114 However, “[s]mall or single-source labs, proprietary labs, and drug 
companies” were absent from “this drafting process.”115 Their voices need to be 
heard. 
Large commercial test manufacturers and clinical laboratories undoubtedly 
bring enormous expertise to the table, but they do not represent the diagnostics 
industry as a whole or the patients and healthcare providers who rely on that 
industry. Large IVD product manufacturers have chafed under the uneven play-
ing field created when their IVD products are subject to slow and costly FDA 
regulatory review while similar LDTs enjoy a faster pathway to market under the 
CLIA regulations.116 These concerns are especially intense in the emerging field 
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of precision medicine.117 Large clinical laboratories, while not eager to be subject 
to FDA oversight, deliver testing services at sufficient volumes to defray the user 
fees and other costs of FDA regulation and potentially might benefit if FDA reg-
ulatory barriers hinder entry by smaller competitors. In recent years, a series of 
court decisions undercut patent eligibility for the kinds of discovery that drive 
innovation in genetic and other diagnostic testing.118 The VALID Act would 
erect FDA regulatory barriers that confer a significant competitive advantage to 
large test manufacturers and clinical laboratories that previously enjoyed patent 
monopolies, now lost.119 What impact would that have on patients for whom 
genetic and other advanced diagnostic testing is often already unaffordable? 
Might tests become even less affordable if new FDA regulatory costs are factored 
in? “During the approval process, the FDA . . . can’t consider the cost to pa-
tients.”120 And what are the impacts on America’s vibrant genomic research la-
boratories, which CLIA shields from burdensome federal regulation121 but 
which would face far more significant regulatory burdens under the VALID Act’s 
“research exemption”?122 Congress needs answers to these and many other ques-
tions before acting on legislative proposals. 
conclusion 
Setting aside debates about statutory authority, the FDA’s 2020 EUA guid-
ances for COVID-19 testing had a practical binding effect. They subjected labor-
atory services to FDA oversight that may have cost time in a context where lost 
time meant lost lives. It will be critical to understand whether FDA’s review, 
which essentially duplicated the internal validation procedures laboratories al-
ready must perform under CLIA, added sufficient value to make the cost of delay 
and burdens on smaller labs worthwhile. It also is crucial to ask whether one-
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size-fits-all FDA jurisdiction to regulate all LDTs, as proposed in the VALID Act, 
is good policy. Genetic, genomic, and other advanced molecular diagnostic tests 
may raise special concerns that require tailored policy solutions. These policies, 
however, should be pursued without disturbing policies that have performed 
well for many decades for more traditional types of tests, including tests for 
emerging infectious diseases. Before Congress acts on specific legislative pro-
posals, there needs to be a much broader, more inclusive, nuanced, and evidence-
informed dialogue about diagnostic-testing policy. 
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